

Architecting Secure Serverless and Containerized Applications

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
"Security is everyone's job"

Werner Vogel AWS CTO

Four principles to securing modern applications

- 1. Understand shared responsibility model
- 2. Grant least privilege
- 3. Implement defense in depth
- 4. Secure your software supply chain

Building modern applications with microservices




Security considerations for microservices

- More transient and dynamic
- More distributed and complex
 - More services interdependencies over network
 - Scheduling / scaling / resource management
- Isolation is similar to virtual machines, but different:
 - May share a kernel
 - May share a network and a network interface

(Subset of) Options to build microservices




Comparison of operational responsibility




Security Principle #1: Shared Responsibility with AWS



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Responsibilities change with AWS Fargate



Security benefits of AWS Fargate

We do more, you do less.

- Patching (OS, Docker, Amazon ECS agent, etc.)
- Task isolation
- No --privileged mode for containers
- AES-256 Server side encryption of ephemeral storage



Container orchestration


AWS managed control planes

- Elastic Container Service (ECS)
- Elastic Kubernetes Services (EKS)
- Responsible for managing the scheduling and lifecycle of containers

Data plane

- Self managed EC2
- Managed node groups (EKS only)
- Fargate (ECS and EKS)

With Serverless, AWS takes an even greater share of responsibility




Lambda service composed of control plane and data plane

Control Plane

- Management APIs, such as:
 - CreateFunction
 - UpdateFunctionCode
- Requires IAM permission to access

Data Plane

- Invoke Lambda function via Invoke
- Requires IAM permission or resource policy
- When invoked, data plane runs code on:
 - Existing execution environment, if exists
 - New environment, after allocation



Security Principle #2: Least Privilege

Security principle #2: Least Privilege

- Grant only the essential privileges needed to perform intended work
- Attach to compute via execution role
 - Prefer unique role per function or task
 - Enforce permission boundaries
- Be specific: identify limited set of resources and actions allowed
 - Scrutinize use of "*"

•••

Use AWS IAM to assign and audit fine-grained permissions

- IAM roles can be assigned to:
 - ECS Tasks
 - Kubernetes Pods
 - Lambda Functions
 - Step Functions Workflows
 - ... and more ...
- Allow (or deny) access to AWS APIs (management, data planes)
- Periodically audit access
 - AWS Access Advisor
 - Amazon CloudTrail Insights
 - Kubernetes audit log/CloudWatch

. . .

User access

Apply principles of least privilege.

- Authenticate all user access to hosts and containers.
- Implement IAM policies and roles to restrict access to only required services.
- Restrict access and write permissions to image registry.



Security Principle #3: Practice Defense in Depth



Common vectors of attack







App Vulnerabilities


Dependencies

Host / Network

SQL Injection Cross-site Scripting (XSS) OWASP Top 10 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Libraries Distributions Base Images Patching Network Segmentation


Security principle #3: Practice Defense in Depth


- Implement multiple, redundant measures across system to address common attack vectors
- Leverage AWS managed services and integrations
- Consider service features, e.g. backup and encryption




Container versus Virtual Machine

Virtual Machine





One & only one task per EC2 instance



Containers: Runtime security options

- Containers run as processes on the Linux kernel
- Linux options:
 - cgroups
 - namespaces
 - Linux capabilities
 - seccomp*
 - AppArmor*
 - SELinux*
- * Not applicable to serverless containers (Fargate)

- 3rd party and open source security options include:
 - Aqua
 - Falco (CNCF project)
 - PA Primsa
 - Redhat StackRox
 - Sysdig Secure

Containers: Network security options

- Restrict communication between:
 - Pods and Tasks
 - Containerized applications and other resources that run within or outside the VPC
- Encrypt traffic between:
 - Pods, Tasks, Instances, Lambda functions (future)
 - AWS load balancers and tasks/pods


Service specific options

- EKS
 - Kubernetes Network Policies
 - Security Groups for Pods
 - App Mesh (TLS & mTLS)
 - SSL/TLS (load balancing/ingress)

• ECS

- Security Groups for Tasks
- App Mesh (TLS & mTLS)
- SSL/TLS (load balancing)

Fargate networking: A deeper look



Fargate: Process isolation

Fargate implements a shared nothing architecture


- Disk
- Memory
- CPU
- Network

Each task/pod runs as a separate virtual machine (EC2 or Firecracker)

Both VM types provide a hard security boundary









Firecracker is built on KVM, the same hypervisor that EC2 Nitro instances are built on.

Hardware virtualization ensures that tasks from different customers can run safely on the same physical machine.

Fargate on Firecracker networking: A deeper look



Firecracker enhances isolation of tasks




Lambda Function isolation


- Each function runs in a dedicated execution environment
 - Each execution environment handles one concurrent invocation
- Execution environment may be reused between invocations
 - Use caution when storing sensitive data in memory or /tmp
- AWS maintains runtime and execution environment
 - Patching, etc.

aws

• Does not apply to container packaging




Serverless architectures are small pieces, loosely joined



Securing a Serverless web service


SQLi rules

OWASP Top 10




Common ask: How do I secure access to my API? Are API keys good enough?

- Options for authorization:
 - IAM
 - Cognito user pool/JWT
 - Lambda authorizer
- Can be used with:
 - AWS WAF
 - Resource policies
 - Mutual TLS (mTLS)



Common ask: Should my Lambda function be VPC-enabled?


- Lambda functions <u>always</u> run in VPCs owned by the Lambda service team
 - When VPC enabled, configured with access to your VPC via an ENI
- Lambda functions are <u>always invoked</u> via Invoke action
 - Access controlled by AWS IAM
- Answer: <u>Only</u> if your function:
 - Needs access to resources in the VPC
 - Desire to restrict outbound network path



Security Principle #4: Secure Your Software Supply Chain


Security principle #4: Secure Your Software Supply Chain

- Keep it simple
 - Prefer single responsibility
 - Easier to debug; cleaner IAM privileges
- Never hardcode secrets in code
 - Use AWS Secrets Manager, Parameter Store
 - Again, never...
- Leverage code and vulnerability scanning
 - Don't forget dependencies



Components of the software supply chain

- Base image*
- Language runtime*
- Open source, third-party packages
- Your code



* May be supplied and/or managed by AWS

Managing dependencies is key

- Understand you dependencies: https://deps.dev/
- Minimize dependencies
- Keep dependencies up-to-date to reduce risk and effort
- Software Bill of Material (SBOM)
- Leverage dependency check tools, such as:
 - OWASP
 - Protego
 - Snyk
 - Twistlock
 - Puresec



Build secure container images for Fargate and Lambda

Minimizing the attack surface

- Create images from Scratch
- Create minimal images (docker-slim)
- Use distro-less images without package manager or shell
- Run the application as a non-root user
- "Defang" your containers
- Lint your Dockerfiles with <u>Dockle</u> or <u>Hadolint</u>
- Scan your images for vulnerabilities (CVEs)

Securing your code

Educate about writing secure code Perform static code analysis (whitebox testing) Perform dynamic security testing

- Proactively inject faults into the application
- Fuzz testing



Thank you!

