



# Architecting Secure Serverless and Containerized Applications


Jeremy Cowan  
Principal Developer Advocate

Josh Kahn  
Principal Solutions Architect

# Microservices emerge as companies grow...




**Monolith**  
Does everything



**Microservices**  
Does one thing


# Microservices manifest throughout workload



# (Subset of) Options to build microservices



**AWS  
Lambda**



**AWS  
Fargate**



**Amazon  
ECS**



**Amazon  
EKS**

# Comparison of operational responsibility



# Security considerations for microservices

- More **transient** and **dynamic**
- More **distributed** and **complex**
  - More services interdependencies over network
  - Scheduling / scaling / resource management
- **Isolation** is similar to virtual machines, but different:
  - May share a kernel
  - May share a network and a network interface

# Security is Everyone's Responsibility



# Four principles of securing modern applications


1. Shared responsibility model
2. Least privilege
3. Defense in depth
4. Secure your software supply chain



# Security Principle #1: Shared Responsibility with AWS


# Security principle #1: Shared Responsibility with AWS

Customer




Customers are responsible for their security and compliance **IN** the Cloud

AWS



AWS is responsible for the security **OF** the Cloud


# Responsibilities change with Amazon on Fargate




# Security benefits of AWS Fargate

We do more, you do less.

- Patching (OS, Docker, Amazon ECS agent, etc.)
- Task isolation
- No --privileged mode for containers
- AES-256 Server side encryption of ephemeral storage



# With Serverless, AWS takes a greater share of responsibility




# Lambda service composed of control plane and data plane

## Control Plane

- Management APIs, such as:
  - `CreateFunction`
  - `UpdateFunctionCode`
- Requires IAM permission to access

## Data Plane

- Invoke Lambda function via
  - `Invoke`
- Requires IAM permission to access
- When invoked, data plane runs code on:
  - Existing execution environment, if exists
  - New environment, after allocation



@MarcJBrooker

# Container orchestration

## AWS managed control planes

- Elastic Container Service (ECS)
- Elastic Kubernetes Services (EKS)

Responsible for managing the scheduling and lifecycle of containers

## Data plane

- Self managed EC2
- Managed node groups (EKS only)
- Fargate (ECS and EKS)

# Security Principle #2: Least Privilege





# Security principle #2: Least Privilege

- Grant only the **essential privileges** needed to perform intended work
- Attach to compute via **execution role**
  - Prefer **unique role** per function or task
  - Enforce permission boundaries
- Be specific: identify limited set of resources and actions allowed
  - Scrutinize use of “\*”

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Action": [
        "xray:PutTraceSegments",
        "xray:PutTelemetryRecords"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Effect": "Allow"
    },
    {
      "Action": "s3:PutObject",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket",
        "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*"
      ],
      "Effect": "Allow"
    }
  ]
}
```

# Use AWS IAM to assign and audit fine-grained permissions

- IAM roles can be assigned to:
  - ECS Tasks
  - Kubernetes Pods
  - Lambda Functions
  - Users
- Allow (or deny) access to AWS APIs (management, data planes)
- Periodically audit access
  - AWS Access Advisor
  - Amazon CloudTrail Insights
  - Kubernetes audit log/CloudWatch

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Action": "s3:PutObject",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket",
        "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*"
      ],
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Conditions": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "aws:PrincipalOrgId": "o-xxxxxxxxxxxx"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

# User access

## Apply principles of least privilege.

- Authenticate all user access to hosts and containers.
- Implement IAM policies and roles to restrict access to only required services.
- Restrict access and write permissions to image registry.




AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM)



Permissions




Role



AWS CloudTrail

Security,  
Governance, and  
Oversight



Authentication

+

Authorization

+

Audit/Log

# Security Principle #3: Practice Defense in Depth



# Common vectors of attack



## App Vulnerabilities

SQL Injection

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

OWASP Top 10

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)



## Dependencies

Libraries

Distributions

Base Images




## Host / Network

Patching

Network Segmentation


# Security principle #3: Practice Defense in Depth

- Implement **multiple, redundant measures** across system to address common attack vectors
- Leverage AWS managed services and integrations
- Consider service features, e.g. backup and encryption





# Container versus Virtual Machine

## Virtual Machine



## Containers





**One & only one task per EC2 instance**



# Containers: Runtime security options

- Containers run as processes on the Linux kernel
- Linux options:
  - cgroups
  - namespaces
  - Linux capabilities
  - seccomp\*
  - AppArmor\*
  - SELinux\*
- 3<sup>rd</sup> party and open source security options include:
  - Aqua
  - Falco (CNCF project)
  - PA Primsa
  - Redhat StackRox
  - Sysdig Secure

\* Not applicable to serverless containers (Fargate)


# Containers: Network security options

- Restrict communication between:
  - Pods and Tasks
  - Containerized applications and other resources that run within or outside the VPC
- Encrypt traffic between:
  - Pods, Tasks, Instances, Lambda functions (future)
  - AWS load balancers and tasks/pods

## Service specific options:

- EKS
  - Kubernetes Network Policies
  - Security Groups for Pods
  - App Mesh (TLS & mTLS)
  - SSL/TLS (load balancing/ingress)
- ECS
  - Security Groups for Tasks
  - App Mesh (TLS & mTLS)
  - SSL/TLS (load balancing)

# Fargate networking: A deeper look



# Fargate: Process isolation

Fargate implements a shared nothing architecture


- Disk
- Memory
- CPU
- Network

Each task/pod runs as a separate virtual machine (EC2 or Firecracker)

Both VM types provide a hard security boundary




# Firecracker




Firecracker is built on KVM, the same hypervisor that EC2 Nitro instances are built on.

Hardware virtualization ensures that tasks from different customers can run safely on the same physical machine.

# Fargate on Firecracker networking: A deeper look




# Firecracker enhances isolation of tasks





# Lambda Function isolation

- Each function runs in a **dedicated** execution environment
  - Each execution environment handles **one concurrent invocation**
- Execution environment **may be reused** between invocations
  - Use caution when storing sensitive data in memory or /tmp
- AWS maintains runtime and execution environment
  - Patching, etc.
  - Does not apply to container packaging






# Serverless architectures are small pieces, loosely joined




# Securing a Serverless web service



# Common ask: Should my Lambda function be VPC-enabled?

- Lambda functions **always** run in VPCs **owned by the Lambda service team**
  - When VPC enabled, configured with **access to your VPC** via an ENI
- Lambda functions are **always invoked** via Invoke action
  - Access controlled by AWS IAM
- Answer: Only if your function:
  - Needs **access to resources in the VPC**
  - Desire to **restrict outbound network path**




# Security Principle #4: Secure Your Software Supply Chain




# Security principle #4: Secure Your Software Supply Chain

- Keep it **simple**
  - Prefer single responsibility
  - Easier to debug; cleaner IAM privileges
- **Never hardcode secrets** in code
  - Use AWS Secrets Manager, Parameter Store
  - Again, never...
- Leverage **code and vulnerability scanning**
  - Don't forget dependencies



# Components of the software supply chain

- Base image\*
- Language runtime\*
- Open source, third-party packages
- Your code



\* May be supplied and/or managed by AWS

# Managing dependencies is key

- Understand your dependencies:  
<https://deps.dev/>
- Minimize dependencies
- Keep dependencies up-to-date to reduce risk and effort
- Leverage dependency check tools, such as:
  - OWASP
  - Protego
  - Snyk
  - Twistlock
  - Puresec



# Build secure container images for Fargate and Lambda

## Minimizing the attack surface

- Create images from Scratch
- Create minimal images (docker-slim)
- Use distro-less images without package manager or shell
- Run the application as a non-root user
- “Defang” your containers
- Lint your Dockerfiles with [Dockle](#) or [Hadolint](#)
- Scan your images for vulnerabilities (CVEs)



# Securing your code

Educate about writing secure code

Perform static code analysis (whitebox testing)

Perform dynamic security testing

- Proactively inject faults into the application
- Fuzz testing

# Incident Response



# Advanced persistent threats

- Crime syndicates
- State-sponsored
- Script kiddies
- Hacktivists, e.g. Anonymous
- Will exploit weaknesses in your defenses
- Will use social engineering
- May be employees
- Attacks are increasing in frequency and sophistication

# Have a plan

- Don't panic
- Create an incident response plan
  - Prevention
  - Collection
  - Remediation
- Practice your response to an incident
- Avoid becoming the next Colonial Pipeline
  - [Help Wanted](#): Develops, validates, and maintains an incident response plan and processes to address potential threats.